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NOTES AND COMMENT
that the corporation, in the contemplation of the legislature, shall not
discontinue its "ordinary and lawful" business. .Surely the legislature
would not require the allegation of an illegal act as a basis of return to
the recognized corporate fold. The corporation, then, under the secre-
tarial ban of forfeiture may continue its business. If it is yet a
corporation in being (its franchise not having been judicially declared
forfeited) what is the status of the directors, and stockholders prior to
the recision of the forfeiture.
-It would seem, that in order to give the statute some force and
effect there must be some change in the corporate entity. The corpora-
tion having been validly organized, we may conclude it to be a true
de jure corporation at the time of organization. Can it then be said,
that the requirements of the statutes as to annual filing of reports is in
the nature of a continuing duty, and compliance with that duty is
necessary to continued existence as a de jure corporation? If we
assume the above, we are faced with the difficulty of declaring that a
failure to file, is a failure to fully comply with the law, and may render
the corporation de facto. If we go further, we may arrive at the
conclusion that failure to file the annual return is an absence of the
essential of "attempted compliance" and thereby render the organiza-
tion not even de facto. These considerations are of prime importance
to the rights of creditors and of third parties, remembering the fact
that the secretary of state, by statute, publishes the forfeitures third
parties and creditors are given notice, and their rights are interwoven
with the theories above expounded.
CHARLES L. GOLDBERG.
Highways-Mere public user for period of twenty years is insuf-
ficient to establish a public highway.:
The B Company, by deed, gave to the state, in 19o7, the land in
question. The state established on part of the land, a camp for tuber-
culosis patients and has since maintained and operated such camp. The
B Company owned and used such lands prior to the sale to the state.
The B Company had opened a tote road in connection with the opera-
tion of its saw mill. In 1890 one, W, built a homestead west of the"
land in question. He developed a summer resort and he and his guests
used the tote road. There were two other approaches to his resort.
The tote road continued in its original state until the state improved
it and claimed it to be an institutional road leading to its tuberculosis
camp. Town Board of Tomahawk in 1919 attempted to lay a highway
through a part of the state camp, but at the request of the state camp
superintendent, rescinded its motion so to do. In 1925, the Town
Board authorized the clearing of the road. Some work was done, but
without the knowledge of the state. State seeks a judgment deter-
mining that the road in question is not a public highway. From a
judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. The supreme court affirmed
the judgment of the Circuit Court.
It was held that the mere naked user of the road for twenty years.
was insufficient to establish a public highway in the absence of circum-
-'State v. Town Board of Tomahawk, 212 N.W., Wis., Feb. 8, x927.
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stances giving rise to a presumption of intent on the part of the owner
to dedicate the road as a public highway.
In order to have a public highway, it must come into existence either
by user or lawful proceedings of the Town Board. Section 80.03
R.S. 1925 provides "that no public highway shall be laid out or through
any . . . yard or inclosure used for educational or charitable pur-
poses." The undisputed facts show the camp was established and
maintained by the state for charitable purposes, and the instant road
would lead through the camp yard. The act, then, of the Town Board
in 1925 to improve the road was wholly void under the statute.
To constitute a highway by prescription, there must be something
more than mere use of the track for ten years or more; there must be
an adverse user for that period. To make the user adverse, some act
showing a claim of right must be done, such as repairing, recognizing
the road as a highway, etc.'
Unless some such act is done, the ten year period required by
statute (80.03) to make a highway of an unrecorded road does not
run. It seems the statute is one of limitation designed to fix the period
in which a user may be created and not to declare the nature of the
user requisite to that end. Mere use does not raise a presumption of
adverse hostile user.3
The intention to dedicate-anitus dedicandi--on the part of the
owner, either express or implied, constitutes the foundation of the
right and there can be no title by prescription or adverse user without
it. A right by prescription cannot be raised against the owner's
wishes; but the use may be so long unobjected to as to authorize a
finding of implied consent. But where the assent of the owner is not
shown and it is neither shown that he objected to or opposed the travel
over his land, the use is permissive. The facts show the user was such
as is commonly made of similar roads in northern Wisconsin. The
travel was permitted by the owner as a convenience for the public; a
mere neighborly consideration, extended until such time as it would
interfere with the owners' rights in or use of the land. "The mere
use of a passway through uninclosed woodland will not constitute a
right of way by prescription. Mere acquiescence in the use is regarded
as permissive."4
The court distinguishes between the use of enclosed and unenclosed
lands holding that it would be a harsh doctrine that would require an
owner to place a guard over his unenclosed lands or be deprived of
valuable rights therein. The weight of authority throughout the coun-
try holds that the mere use of a track or way through unenclosed
lands for the statutory period does not raise the presumption that the
use is hostile to the owner's rights.'
'State v. Joyce, ig Wis. ioi.
'Wiesner v. Jaeger, 175 Wis. 281.
'Bassett v. Soelle, 186 Wis. 53.
'Bales v. Rafferty, 161 Ky. 511, 170 S.W. 1184; Treemp v. McDonnell, 120
Ala. 353, 24 S. 353; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Stewart, 265 Ill. 544, 78 N.E. 76;
Null v. Williamson, 166 Ind. 537, 78 N.E. 76; Hults v. Tendall, 40 S.C.L. 396;
Schulenbarger v. Johnstone, 64 Wash. 202, 116 P. 843.
NOTES AND *COMMENT
The court holds as sound law, the discussion of the elements neces-
sary to constitute by prescription a highway over unenclosed lands,
found in Chief Justice Dixon's dissenting opinion in Hanson v.
Taylor.6 -Dixon there says, "Title acquired by prescription and title
acquired by user, or adverse user as it is commonly called, mean the
same thing. Prescription is defined to be a mode of acquiring title
to an incorporeal hereditament by long and continued usage." He then
declares that in addition to long and continuous user the intention on
the part of the owner to dedicate the soil must positively concur when
he says, "The intention to dedicate animus dedecandi, on the part of
the owner of the soil, constitutes in every case, the foundation of the
right; and there can be no title by prescription or adverse user without
it."
The use may be regarded, rightly, as not hostile to the owner's
rights, since it makes no conflict with any interest the owner has or
does not interfere with any use he presently desires to make of it.
The extent of the custom to travel over unenclosed woodland without
asking the owners' permission repells the presumption of a grant of
the right by the owner which might otherwise arise from a long, con-
tinuous user. A mere use of a passway does not prove anything'detri-
mental to the rights of the owner and hence, will not amount to an
adverse user. Evidence of the adverse character of such use must be
shown by facts other than mere continuous user for the statutory
period.
PATRICIA RYAN
Insurance: Construction of Contracts of.-The general rule of
construction by the courts of all contracts of insurance is that while
like other contracts, they are to be so construed as to give effect to the
intention of the parties, yet where there exists any doubt as to that
intention it is always to be strictly against the insurer and in favor of
the insured.'
However, when we apply the rules of construction to the standard
policy we find that in spite of the fact that in some states insurance
contracts are required by law to be made in accordance with a statutory
form, it is now a well settled rule, that the same rules of construction
are to be applied to the terms of the statutory policy as to other
forms of policies.
We must confess that many of the decisions, rendered by the courts
of the highest jurisdictions, justify the assertion which is often made,
that courts apply a different rule.of construction to insurance con-
tracts than to other contracts.2 As a matter of law and justice, in-
surance contracts should be decided on the same basis as other con-
tracts, so as to give the full effect to the intention of the parties. But
consider the peculiar circumstances under which, insurance contracts
are made. The terms are chosen by the insurer without any consulta-
tion with the insured; the language used is ambiguous, doubtful and
23 Wis. 547.
'Definition of Wm. R. Vance, professor of George Washington University.
'Welch v. Fire Association, (Wisconsin 19o4) 98 N.W. 2z7.
